

SOFTWARE COMPLEXITY METRICS IN GENERAL AND IN THE CONTEXT OF ISO 26262 SOFTWARE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

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Motivation for our research – safe cars

- The number of functions that are software steered grows as well
 - Autonomous driving >> 50 pure software functions
- Exponential growth of vehicle's software size
 - The number of ECUs grows exponentially (2 ECUs in 1970 to over 130 in 2016)
 - The amount of software grows exponentially

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- We face new challenges
 - How to verify and validate all the software?
 - How to increase sw dev. speed if the sw. complexity grows?





Complexity in the software of modern cars

- Software complexity
 - The degree of connectivity between entities in a program
- Metrics (examples)
 - Cyclomatic complexity metric (McCabe)
 - Software science metrics (Halstead)
 - Software Structure Metrics (Henry and Kafura)
 - Metrics Suite for Object Oriented Design (Chidamber and Kamerer)
 - Branching complexity (Sneed)
 - Data access complexity (Card)
 - Data complexity (Chapin)
 - Data flow complexity (Elshof)
 - Decisional complexity (McClure)



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Problem de



Complexity of decision algorithms in practice



Altinger, H., Siegl, S., Dajsuren, Y., & Wotawa, F. (2015, May). A novel industry grade dataset for fault prediction based on model-driven developed automotive embedded software. In 2015 IEEE/ACM 12th Working Conference on Mining Software Repositories (MSR), pp. 494-497, IEEE Computer Society Press.



Overview of V&V requirements from ISO 26262 Software design and implementation

- Walkthrough
- Inspection
- Semi-formal verification
- Control-flow analysis
- Data-flow analysis
- Static code analysis
- Semantic code analysis





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- Efficiency
 - 125 source statement/hour during individual preparation
 - 90-125 statements/hour can be inspected during inspection meeting
- Inspection is therefore an expensive process
 - Inspecting 500 lines costs about 40 man/hours effort about €2000



The big questions are

- When will we stop being able to secure the safety of the software?
- How can we release software that we cannot safety-assure?
- When will we experience "emergent" behaviour caused by the lack of control over complexity?





Q1: When will we stop being able to secure the safety of the software?

- Motivating case: Software testing
- 1 execution/control path >= 1 test case
- Modern software > 1000 execution/control paths per module!
- Modern software >> 1000 modules



Knauss, Eric, Miroslaw Staron, Wilhelm Meding, Ola Söder, Agneta Nilsson, and Magnus Castell. "Supporting continuous integration by codechurn based test selection." In Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Rapid Continuous Software Engineering, pp. 19-25. IEEE Press, 2015.





Q2: How can we release software that we cannot safety-assure?

• Motivating case: Tesla's autopilot

- A handful of times I instinctively grabbed the wheel or hit the brakes when a few impatient New York drivers cut me off, not really sure if the car would figure out what was happening. I'm sure the car would have, but I didn't want to be responsible for crunching up a \$120,000 car I didn't own. Only once did the car ask me to retake control, ostensibly because it couldn't read the nearly nonexistent lane markings.
 - Chris Perkins, Mashable.com, about driving in Manhattan



